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BOOK REVIEW
Justice At Nuremberg, by Robert E. Conot. Harper & Row New York,
1983. Pp. 593.
There is a scene captured for all time in Leni Riefenstahl's "The
Triumph of the Will"' where, immediately following a particularly fer-
vid outburst made during a speech at the 1936 Nuremberg rally, Hitler
pauses to catch his breath and listen to the cheering crowd. During
this pause, Hitler slams his fist into his hand, characteristically brushes
back his sweaty forlock, and then smiles gleefully. Why was this
ideologue, who had undoubtedly just finished making some point he
considered to be important, smiling in the midst of his serious speech?
It is an interesting question, and one this reader has pondered, because
it seemed such an odd time to smile.
It is my belief that Hitler's was a smile of satisfaction because
he knew that the crowd believed in what he was saying and that they
would do his bidding. And, of course, ultimately they did his bidding.
History has shown Hitler to have been correct in thinking they would.
What it was he commanded, and what it was they did, is the
tale told by Robert Conot in Justice at Nuremberg.! This book is the
finest comprehensive rendering of the first, and most closely followed,
of the war crimes trials following the Second World War. Conot has
covered all the important facets of this trial and asked all the right
questions. Whether the questions raised by that trial can ever be
answered is itself an open question.
Almost everyone has heard of the Nuremberg trials. People in
positions of authority are acutely aware of this fact. William
Westmoreland, American commander during the height of the Viet-
Nam War, wonders in his memoirs whether top American military
and civilian leaders of the Southeast Asian war effort could be held
culpable under Nuremberg sort of principles in light of incidents such
a My Lai.' He answers, not surprisingly, in the negative. Although
"Westy's" memoirs reminded this reader - again, probably not sur-
1. Leni Riefenstahl was able to propagate the Nazi ethos through her films,
including this one. She transformed propaganda into art of a sort. She may have been
the only real Nazi artist. Since the war's end, she has been unable to raise money
for any substantial film projects.
2. R. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG, (1983) (hereinafter cited as CONOT).
3. W. WESTMORELAND, A SOLDIER REPORTS, 499, (1980).
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prisingly - of the type of narrow military analyses and justifications
written by some of the German generals and admirals such as
Guderian, Manstein,5 and Doenitz, it is still significant that
Westmoreland raised the question. The clear implication is that even
among those who engage in what passes for ethical musing at the
Pentagon, there is still at least a public relations sensitivity to con-
cerns raised at the Nuremberg trials. There have been, as we are
all too painfully aware, few military men historically who have felt
obliged even to wonder aloud about such matters.
During the American involvement in Southeast Asia, such mat-
ters were the concern of the signatories of a document entitled "A
Declaration of Conscience."7 The Declaration is presumably still on
file today with some agency of the United Nations. It was signed by
tens of thousands who enunciated their opposition for moral reasons
to American military involvement in the Southeast Asian conflict. In-
voked in that document was what was referred to as the "Nuremberg
Principle."8 This term refers to the ethical primacy of individual con-
science over orders from superiors and the state.
The articulation of that principle recognizes in reverse fashion
the heart of one of the two defenses proffered by the original, and
subsequent, Nuremberg defendants. Conot discusses and analyzes
these defenses in detail. The first defense was basically a factual one,
claiming that everything in the bureaucracy of the Third Reich was
4. H. GUDERIAN, PANZER LEADER. (1952). Guderian's importance in the develop-
ment of the armored warfare blitzkrieg techniques pioneered by the German militarists
early in the war cannot be overstated. Later in the war, he served as Army Chief
of Staff, in which capacity it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for him to
have been unaware of various atrocities perpetrated against Russian civilians and
soldiers.
5. E. MANSTEIN, LOST VICTORIES, (1958). Von Manstein was responsible for the
restoration of a condition of fragile stasis on the Eastern Front following the Stal-
ingrad debacle. His name was touted about from time to time as a possible Commander-
In-Chief for the Eastern Front. Like other high ranking German generals who served
on the Eastern Front, he would have had to have been nearly deaf and blind to have
been unaware of the atrocities visited upon the Russian people.
6. K. DOENITZ, MEMOIRS: TEN YEARS AND TWENTY DAYS, (1958). Doenitz was
one of the original Nuremberg defendants. His command of the German submarines
was so deadly that there were some months when it was not entirely clear that Bri-
tain would be able to import enough of anything to survive, let alone wage effective war.
7. "A Declaration of Conscience" was a petition enunciating the specifics of
the reasons for opposing the View-Nam War on moral grounds. It was circulated in
newspapers and magazines, and the document with the signatures placed on file with
the United Nations.
8. The term "Nuremberg Principle" evolved out of these trials and is today
used to justify disobedience to illegal orders.
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so tightly compartmentalized that no one knew anything outside of
his own sphere, e.g., no one knew much of anything about the various
horrors. A person who does not know that evil is occurring, certainly
cannot be held responsible for it.
What the "Nuremberg Principle" refers to more specifically is
the second defense, one grounded more in law than in fact: "I was
only following orders." The notion embodied in this defense is that
an order from a superior, could, should, and did supersede any and
all ethical and moral proscriptions and requirements. So one drops
the Zyklon B into the "shower room," and as long as one has been
instructed to do that, the fact that people are thereby gassed is some-
one else's concern. Any explicit or implicit moral concerns have been
considered and resolved at a higher level, and one's otherwise un-
conscionable conduct is excused. It purports to be, in essence, rather
an elegant means of excusing one's own misdeeds by passing respon-
sibility up the chain of command.
It was not a defense that succeeded, either in the original, or
later, Nuremberg proceedings. And therein lies much of the substance
of the tale told by Conot. Justice at Nuremberg is a comprehensive
analysis and dissection of the original of these trials.' The book is
organized around large sections entitled "Crime and Punishment," "In-
terrogation and Indictment," "Prosecution," "Defense," and "Judg-
ment." The chapters follow this organizational scheme so that the
overall rendering roughly follows the chronology of the trial.
The trial was prosecuted by a joint team comprised of American,
British, Russian, and French lawyers. Justice Robert Jackson headed
the American team, and Conot discusses the political wranglings that
swirled around the Justice.0 The same powers, using four judges and
four alternates, tried the case. German lawyers, paid by the tribunal,
conducted the defense. Of the twenty-one defendants charged, three
were acquitted, seven were given terms of years to life imprisonment,
and eleven were sentenced to death by hanging.
The ramifications of this proceeding were staggering. There was
virtually no legal precedent for such an undertaking. Various ques-
tions were asked when the tribunal was constituted; and these ques-
tions are still asked today. Was there a legal right to try these peo-
9. There have been other works. See, e.g., EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF
THE GERMANS, (1966). But none have, in this reader's opinion, so comprehensively dis-
cussed "all" important aspects, i.e., the factual, legal, moral, philosophical, psychological,
and political.
10. CONOT, supra note 2, at 442-43.
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ple? Was there a legal necessity? How did the conducting of this trial
accord with American prohibitions on ex post facto justice? Should
numbers of the defendants have been disposed of summarily in one
fashion or another as they were apprehended by the various conquer-
ing powers rather than be provided a forum to put forth their ra-
tionalizations, evasions, and prevarications?
This also raises the dual question whether anyone's hands were
clean enough to try these people, and whether it mattered. How, to
choose a single example, does one try a country and its leaders for
plotting and launching a war of aggression when either you plotted
it with them, or passed them on the way to the war? The first situa-
tion was the case with Germany and the Soviet Union in Poland,1
the latter with Germany and Great Britain in Norway. 2 On the issue
of genocide, one might inquire of the Soviets where large numbers
of their peoples have gone-the Volga German colony during World
War II being one group. One could also inquire, for that matter, of
our own ancestors where all the Native Americans went. On strictly
legal grounds, how does one answer the retort of Klaus Barbie' 3 that
the Germans had every lawful right to repress the maquis since
the French had indeed signed an armistice, promising to lay down
their arms in exchange for the Germans' ending the war?
What Justice at Nuremberg succeeds in doing is to demonstrate
how what was conceived initially to be largely a moral statement,
which would set.a precedent in international law for future conduct,
broke down at times into a spectacle of legal and political wrangling
over various factual or technical legal matters. The problems involved
in launching such an undertakinig as this trial were immense, and at
times it appeared that the entire venture might never get off the
ground. To ask the threshold question, whose substantive and pro-
cedural law should be used? There was not, and, despite this trial,
is not to this day any international criminal code as such.
11. Germany and the Soviet invaded, conquered, and partitioned Poland in
1939. This was not the first time Poland had suffered because of its geography, and
undoubtedly will not be the last.
12. German and English warships crossed each other's paths in 1940 on their
way into Norwegian waters.
13. Klaus Barbie ran the Gestapo office in Lyons, France. He tortured to death
the French resistance leader, Jean Moulin. After the war, he worked for the Americans
as a counter-intelligence operative. He has been apprehended and is being tried at
Lyons, by the French. See Klaus Barbie and the United States Government: A Report
to the Attorney General of the United States, submitted by Allen A. Ryan, Jr., Special
Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, United States Depart-
ment of Justice, (August 2, 1983).
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Should the defendants have been charged with murder under
German domestic law? Under this approach would a legal defense be
that the orders came from the chief of state and head of government,
so as an a priori matter, they could not be illegal? On the procedural
side of the ledger, there was the question whether the trial should
have been conducted as an American adversarial proceeding or a Euro-
pean inquisitorial one. Merely invoking international law provided no
ready solution. The Geneva Convention and other such similar in-
struments provide no sanctions for transgressors. International custom
arguably is on the side of the defendants in particular cases.1
So the question arises, as it did at the outset of the trial, whether
these trials should have been held at all. The answer to that question
is, I believe, the success of this book. After recognizing and discount-
ing for the hypocrisy, mendacity, blood-thirst and other motives of
the victors-and these were all most assuredly present-Conot leaves
us with the scenes recorded in the film "The Nazi Plan," shown dur-
ing the trial. The following statement is typical of the film. One scene
in particular ...
I mean the clearing out of the Jews, the extermina-
tion of the Jewish race. Most of you must know what it
means when one hundred corpses are lying side by side,
or five hundred or one thousand. To have stuck it out and
at the same time to have remained decent fellows that is
what has made us hard. This is a page of glory in our
history! . . .
The speaker was Himmler, and the statement demands judgment,
which is what the victors intended to provide at Nuremberg. Accord-
ing to Conot, the film had a great impact on everyone in the court-
room, including the defendants.
What was primarily on trial at Nuremberg, when all was said
and done, were the results of the Nazi ideology. Fifty million civilians
and soliders died as a result of the various invasions, occupations, im-
14. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLFS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 428, (1973)
(particularly the discussion of the Corfu Channel case). This reader, for one, concludes
that since the application of force is not always prohibited by international law, that
the German occupation of the Rhineland may not have been clearly prohibited. If the
French were justified in ignoring the armistice imposed on them by the Germans,
perhaps the Germans were justified in ignoring the Versailles treaty which was im-
posed on "them" by the Allies after the First World War.
15. CONOT, supra note 2, at 198. "A Nazi Plan" was excerpted from, among other
footage, Riefenstahl's "The Triumph of the Will." See supra note 1.
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prisonments, gassings, burnings, beatings, starvings, whippings, freez-
ings, lung-collapsings, infections, and on and on and on. This was done,
of course, all in the name of a creed which deliberately dehumanized,
and brutalized whole peoples pursuant to the half-baked "master-race"
scheme.
Also publicized at the trial were some of the morally ambiguous
situations, or situations demonstrating that the Germans were not
always wholly in the wrong. These are troubling matters, even - or
perhaps especially - for supporters of the trial.
An incident recounted by Conot is particularly interesting."6 In
the spring of 1942 a German U-boat captain by the name of Werner
Hartenstein ordered the sinking of the British auxiliary warship the
"Laconia". It was sunk. He then radioed the German admiralty to
report. Admiral Doenitz, the German submarine commander, and from
1943 on, German naval commander, and the Vichy French, responded.
Rowboats were lined up, linked by rope and towed toward Africa
behind the U-boats. Some survivors were put aboard the U-boats.
Hartenstein, the German admiralty, and the Vichy French were
endeavoring to save the civilians following the military act of sinking
the auxiliary warship.
This odd procession never reached the African coast because en
route they were attacked by the Americans from the air. Sharks,
drawn by the blood took over from there. Hartenstein, not surpris-
ingly, cast off, submerged, and ran for cover. That was the last time
a U-boat attempted to rescue any of its victims. Admiral Doenitz
justified somewhat ambiguous orders given following the Laconia sink-
ing regarding future U-boat conduct by pointing to military necessity
and also by deposing Admiral Nimitz, the U.S. Pacific Naval Com-
mander. Doenitz received a ten year prison sentence.
In addition to factual situations, which tended to prove that the
Germans were not always in the wrong, there was also, as Conot ap-
propriately points out, the continued German assertion of tu quoque,
although this was formally forbidden. They were saying, "If I am
guilty, you are too!" One thinks, for example, of the terror bombings
of various German cities. When Private Kurt Vonnegut of Indianapolis,
Indiana, emerged from Slachthaus-Funf in Dresden, Germany, he
beheld a scene of horror.17 Allied bombers had set the fairy tale city
16. CONOT at 324.
17. VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTER-HOUSE FIVE (1971). This story is Vonnegut's fictional-
ized accounting of his wartime experiences.
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aflame and burned thousands of refugees to death. There were no
significant military targets in Dresden and the allies knew it. Moral-
ity aside, as the military puts it, the advocates of terror bombing have
been proven wrong again and again and again. The British did not
surrender because the Luftwaffe nightly bombed their cities, nor did
the Germans because the allies did likewise, nor did the Spanish
Republic after Guernica, nor did the Vietnamese a few years back
when American B-52's destroyed villages and villagers. In this par-
ticular instance, Hermann Goering was acquitted of charges involv-
ing the bombings of Warsaw, Rotterdam, and Coventry.
Goering cheated the hangman on the way to the gallows, as had
Hitler before the war ended.'8 The British had picked up Himmler,
but he bit into a cyanide capsule he had in his teeth, and despite
fevered efforts to save him, he died and could not be brought to trial.
Martin Bormann slid away during the battle of Berlin, possibly avail-
ing himself of Odessa, as also probably did Eichmann, Mengele, and
many others. There were some big fish at Nuremberg - Goering, Speer,
Keitel, Jodl - but many slipped away. This was convenient to many
there who blamed a lot on Hitler and Himmler and others.
Of the big fish who were there, the cases of Keitel and Speer
were especially interesting, and the important parts of those cases
are recounted in Justice at Nuremberg.'9 Keitel and Speer claimed,
in effect, that they were people in power who were in a morally am-
biguous position. They attempted to justify themselves by pointing
to the evil they deflected. They asked the judges to consider what
would have happened had they not been in power. One thinks of
General Jaruselski declaring martial law in Poland to obviate what
the Russians saw as a need to invade and restore order following
the spread of Solidarity.
This was the heart of General Keitel's, and not only Keitel's,
defense at Nuremberg. Yes, yes, yes, he replied, I was present dur-
ing the formulation of the "lynch law" for captured Allied airmen.
But I asked that regular procedures be established for such lynchings.
Yes, said Armaments Minister Speer, I used slave labor. But I asked
that they be better fed and then cast the whole issue in economic
terms the better to improve the condition of people working and liv-
ing in caves without adequate sanitary facilities and being fed a few
hundred calories a day. They tried. They all tried. Things could have
18. Hitler and Goering both poisoned themselves.
19. CONOT, supra note 2, at 355-58 and 433-44.
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been so much worse. I have often wondered whether more damage
has been done historically by those who followed the laws of their
societies, or by those who did not. Neither this book nor the
Nuremberg proceedings have answered that question, but the ques-
tion has been raised in both instances in a most intriguing fashion.
Chris Kirkwood*
* Acting Law Librarian, Valparaiso University School of Law Library; J.D.,
M.L.S., Indiana University.
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